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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 15556

-vsJACK Wl'.RREN NOMELAND
and DONALD FARRELL,
Defendants-Appellants.:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1977 Supp.).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On November 9, 1977, the matter was tried in the
Fourth Judicial District before the Honorable J. Robert
Bullock, District Judge, sitting with a jury.

Both defen-

dants were convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment and
sentence of the lower court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent concurs with the statement of facts as
presented in Appellant's brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION BY GIVING
JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER THIRTEEN.
At the end of the trial in question, Judge Bullock
cautioned the jury with the following instruction:
"A defendant in a criminal case is
not required to testify in his own behalf.
The law expressly gives him the privilege
of not testifying if he so desires. The
fact that defendant Jack Warren Nomeland
has not taken the witness stand must not
be taken as any indication of his guilt,
nor should you indulge in any presumption
or inference adverse to him by reason
thereof. The burden remains with the state,
regardless of whether the defendant testifies
in his own behalf or not, to prove by the
evidence his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."
(R.26)
An almost identical instruction was the focal point

I
I

I
i
I

I
I

of a recent United States Supreme Court case.
Oregon, 46 L.W. 4248

In Lakesid~\

(March 22, 1978) the trial judge gave

an instruction which read:
"Under the laws of this State a
defendant has the option to take the
witness stand to testify in his or her
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own behalf.
If a defendant chooses
not to testify, such a circumstance
gives rise to no inference or presumption against the defendant, and this
must not be considered by you in
determining the question of guilt or
innocence." Id. at 4249
The petitioner in Lakeside presented the same
argument that appellant presents in the present case.

He

contended that "this protective instruction becomes constitutionally impermissible when given over defendant's
objection." Id. at 4249.
In concluding that this argument was without merit
the Court observed,
"The petitioner's argument would
require indulgence in two very doubtful
assumptions: First, that the jurors have
not noticed that the defendant did not
testify and will not, therefore, draw
adverse inferences on their own. Second,
that the jurors will totally disregard
the instruction, and affirmatively give
weight to what they have been told not
to consider at all. Federal constitutional
law cannot rest on speculative assumptions
so dubious as these." Id. at 4250.
The Court specifically distinguished the facts of
Lakeside from the case established in Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 690, 85 s.ct. 1229 (1965), a case cited in appellant's
brief.

In Griffin the instruction given by the trial court

stated that the jury could take defendant's failure to testify
into consideration during its deliberation.

Id. at 610.

~he

Supreme Court found that this comment did violate defendant's
constitutional rights. Id. at 614.
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The Court in Lakeside found an important difference
between the cautionary comment set out in Lakeside and the
adverse comment given in Griffin:
"The Court concluded in Griffin
that unconstitutional compulsion was
inherent in a trial where prosecutor
and judge were free to ask the jury to
draw adverse inferences from a defendant's
failure to take the witness stand.
But
a judge's instruction that the jury must
draw no adverse inferences of any kind from
the defendant's exercise of his privilege
not to testify is 'comment' of an entirely
different order. Such an instruction cannot provide the pressure on a defendant
found impremissible in Griff in.
On the
contrary, its very purpose is to remove
from the jury's deliberations any influence
of unspoken adverse inferences.
46 L.W.
at 4250.
Such a cautionary instruction serves to

clarify~!

fact that a defendant has a constitutionally protected option [
to testify or not, as he deems appropriate.

This clarificatio:I

does not waive a red flag of negative inference in front of

I

the jury.

(

1.

This conclusion was also established in a New Mexico
case.

In New Mexico v. Garcia, 84 N.M. 519, 505 P.2d 862 (Bi:

two co-defendants were convicted of rape.

I

The judge gave an

instruction similiar to the one in question since only OM~
the co-defendant's had testified during the trial.

I

The supre:;I

Court said that defendant's argument that this instruction was
prejudicial was meritless.

"In effect, Garcia attempts to

avoid an instruction which protects a constitutional right."
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l

Id. at 863.

See also Hanks v. United States, 388 F.2d 171

(10th Cir. 1968).
This Court should affirm the trial court's actions
in the giving of the cautionary instruction in question.
This result is mandated by law and logic.

As commented in

Lakeside, supra, "(i]t would be strange indeed to conclude
that this cautionary instruction violates the very constitutional provision it is intended to protect."
CONCLUSION
The instruction given by trial court which cautioned
the jury against making any negative presumptions or inferences
because one of the defendants

did not testify was properly

given for the purpose of protecting appellant's important right
against compulsory self-incrimination.

Such action violated

no rights or appellant and should be affirmed.
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